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Empirical research paints a dynamic picture of the evolution of private 
provision in urban drinking water. A second wave of privatisation is 
clustered in a key group of countries, distinguished by the rise of new 
domestic private and quasi-private providers.  This is, however, taking 
place in the presence of a counter-dynamic of remunicipalisation.  In 
response to the complexity in provision arrangements revealed, three case 
studies are used to illustrate how different power balance configurations 
in the state-society-capital complex inform particular institutional 
arrangements.  In Germany, civil society pressure challenged private 
capital resulting in the reinstatement of municipal control in Berlin, but at 
high long-term costs.  In Russia, disempowered civil society has watched 
as the ruling regime exploits the support of international public agencies 
and foreign investors, while carefully safeguarding the interests of 
domestic private capital.  In China, different levels of the state have 
promoted quasi-state actors into global corporations, managing the entry 
of international capital in order to bolster domestic support for desired 
political reforms. Public responsibility, and equally the re-assertion of 
public control after a period of private provision, may not in itself secure 
net social benefit where the right of capital to profit is put before broader 
social considerations.   
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1.  Introduction 
The first systematic wave of privatisation of urban water supply took place in the 1990s; 
however by the early 2000s, popular opinion in many of the early adopters had turned 
against private provision, leading to what has been called a ‘strategic retreat’ (Bakker 
2009) of both public authorities and private companies from the pursuit of a strategy of 
private provision.  Lobina and Hall (2008) attempted to quantify what has since become 
termed ‘remunicipalisations’, revealing that the transfer from public to private provision 
was not irreversible.  The remunicipalisation/renationalisation of the urban water 
supply occurred in a number of what had been flagship cities for the proponents of 
privatisation (Kishimoto et al. 2015, Lobina et al. 2014, Pigeon et al. 2012).  
Privatisation here refers not to the outright transfer of ownership rights, but to 
arrangements where responsibility for water supply is held by a company controlled by 
private owners. This includes all concessions, leases and management contracts under 
which a private company is responsible for the operation of urban water distribution. 
However, one unifying element of many of these arrangements is that the public sector 
holds the ultimate liability for ensuring overall investment levels as well as profit 
margins stipulated in private contracts. In this way, even where public responsibility is 
reasserted, private companies may continue to receive public funds according to 
contractual stipulations, and thus extend the period of de facto privatisation. 
There is now a debate in the literature over whether the first wave of privatisation was 
the high water mark, with inevitable if uneven retreat to public provision; or whether 
private providers have responded to the failures of the first wave, and have embarked 
upon a strategy of ‘shallow expansion’ (Pierce 2015). Research presented in this paper 
contributes to this debate in two ways. First, it provides new empirical evidencei on the 
evolution of provision arrangements in the urban water sector.  In a nutshell, claims that 
privatisation has peaked may be premature.  Providing evidence to support the 
anecdotal observations of Pierce (2015), we find that a new wave of privatisation is 
clustered in a key group of countries.  To Pearce’s list of China, India and the Gulf states, 
we would add Russiaii. In these countries, one of the most important changes observed 
has been the rise of domestic private and quasi-private providers. At the same time, 
campaigns for public control of urban water, centred in Latin/North America and 
Western Europe, have made significant progress in rolling back private provision in 
places where it had taken root.  In short, urban water provision remains contested 
terrain populated by an increasingly diverse range of organisational forms which blur 
the boundary between public and private provision.  
Second, through the use of case studies, we supplement the empirical summary with an 
examination of why provision arrangements assume the particular form that they do.  
To do this we build upon Nicos Poulantzas’ theorisation of the state to illustrate how 
various combinations of agencies across the state-society-capital complex lead to 
equally various outcomes and institutional configurations. The first case study looks at 
the remunicipalisation of the urban water supply in Berlin, where, despite the relative 
strength of civil society campaigns for public control, the costs of remunicipalisation 
hang over attempts to ensure greater citizen control over the management of the utility. 
Thus privatisation of public money carries on even after de jure remunicipalisation took 
place. The second case study looks at the recent history of reforms in Russia.  We argue 
that the assertion of state control that has been interpreted as a protectionist exercise 
 
 
restricting foreign capital entry, has, in fact, been used to obfuscate the transfer of assets 
and income streams to private agents close to the state regime.  The final case study 
looks at the symbolic importance of the handling of urban water provision in Shenzhen, 
revealing the desire of state officials to build both economic and political power through 
the promotion of a globally-competitive “public” utility.  
In the next section, we detail the methodology employed to construct our database of 
urban water supply provision as well as its limitations; this is followed by the 
presentation and discussion of our empirical findings.  In the third section we elaborate 
our political economy framework for unpacking the reasons for and complexity of 
particular provision arrangements, followed by discussion of our three case studies.  
The final section concludes.    
2.  Empirical findings on urban water provision 
a.  Methodology 
Lobina and Hall (2008) marked an early attempt to quantify the scale of the 
privatisation of urban water supply worldwide.  Their snapshot was based on the status 
quo in 2006; the current exercise re-visits the data nearly a decade later in order to be 
able to describe not just a static snapshot, but the dynamics of water privatisation.  
In recognition that an exhaustive survey of water providers, large and small, would be 
practically impossible, Lobina and Hall chose as their representative unit of analysis 
those urban agglomerations (hereafter cities) with a population over one million.  As of 
the 2004 census exercise of the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs (UNDESA 2004), 409 conurbations met the criteria, with a total 
population of 1.15 billion, or about 38 per cent of the world’s urban population of 3.04 
billion (see table 2.1).  The same criteria has been used in the current exercise; as of the 
2014 census of UNDESA (2014), there are 496 cities that cross the threshold of one 
million inhabitants, or about 40 per cent of the world’s urban population of 3.9 billioniii.  
To set this in context, 54 per cent of the world’s population in 2014 lived in urban areas 
(UNDESA 2014, p. xxi), thus making the proportion of the world’s population living in 
cities with more than 1 million inhabitants greater than 21 per cent of the world’s total 
population.  
Table 2.1: Cities with a population over 1 million by region, 2004/2014 
Source:  UNDESA 2004, 2014 
The more difficult question from a methodological point of view is how to discriminate 
private from public provision.  Once again for consistency, the current paper has 
employed the same criteria as Lobina and Hall (2008, p. 87).iv The base year was chosen 
as 2000, as this is generally considered to mark the end of the first era of privatisation, 
referred to as the Washington Consensus era.  The designation of an urban water 
provider as either public or private was accomplished through a desk-based survey 
based on four data sources.  First, the PSIRU archives on water privatisation, including 
the detailed data compiled for the Lobina and Hall (2008) exercise were consulted.  
 
 
Second, the Pinsent-Masons water yearbook (Lloyd Owen 2012) (hereafter, PMWY) was 
checked.  PMWY, self-described as ‘the essential guide to the water industry’, has 
exhaustive coverage of cases where there is private sector involvement.  Third, where 
they exist, the websites of the water providers themselves were referenced.  Finally, the 
authors used the Nexis news service and general web searches to complement and 
triangulate the data.   
We accept that there are a number of limitations of such a methodological approach. 
First, for numerous cities, there is no information available from any of the sources 
described above.  In such cases, the default assumption was public provision.  Second, 
processes of urbanisation do not evolve at the same speed and with the same effects 
across the globe. Many countries are absent from our list because they lack large urban 
centres. We recognise that the problem of safe and accessible water provision goes 
beyond these centres and that, furthermore, large cities’ water usage often affects extra-
urban populations by disproportionately tapping into shared water resources.  Third, 
and most crucially for the second part of our argument, there is an increasing blurring of 
the boundary between public and private provision as far as the delivery of service is 
concerned,v and an even greater blurring if one is to consider the distribution of costs 
and benefits those arrangements deliver.  How to treat, for example, cases where costs 
are socialised but profits are privatised and guaranteed by the contracts that public 
bodies have signed with private companies? Or cases where the intertwining of the 
interests of the state and domestic capital take priority over citizens’ interests? Or cases 
where the water provider is technically public, but run as a for-profit enterprise, issuing 
market securities, and prioritising market pricing over universal access? Recognition of 
this complexity points to the necessity of the political economy analysis which 
underpins the case studies in section three. We believe that such analysis can 
complement and inform, rather than negate the benefits of, large-scale comparative 
exercises such as that presented in the subsequent section.    
b.  Findings and discussion 
i.  Global picture 
Eighteen per cent of cities (and 18 per cent of population) with a population over one 
million worldwide are served by private providers, increasing from 11 per cent a decade 
earlier.  Lobina and Hall (2008) predicted that the percentage of cities of over one 
million inhabitants with private providers would fall.  What happened to contradict that 
prediction?  First, in a number of key countries political support has swung behind 
privatisation, including those where demographic trends have added to the number of 
large cities (China, India, and Saudi Arabia), as well as those where demographic growth 
has slowed (Russia and Mexicovi). In the rest of the world, struggles to reverse 
privatisation in high-income countries may be counterbalanced by a shift to pro-private 
centre-right governments in key countries in the LAC region, including Brazil, Argentina 
and Chile.   Second, in developing countries, changes in corporate behaviour in the water 
sector have been misinterpreted as essentially post-neoliberal. Bakker (2013, p. 253) 
argues that ‘the continued growth of private-sector activity, combined with the strategic 
retreat of private companies from certain countries and regions, should be interpreted 
as a partial intensification of—rather than straightforward retreat from—
neoliberalisation.’ The case studies in section three confirm the changing nature of the 
 
 
dynamic in the public-private relationship rather than retreat from privatisation 
altogether. 
Table 2.2: World snapshot 2015 and movement 2000-2015 (cities > 1mn) 
During the 15-year period under examination, 2000 to 2015, there were 56 cities that 
switched from public to private provision (see table 2.2), while 21 cities moved in the 
opposite directionvii, for a net change of 35 privatisations (that is, nationalisations minus 
privatisations).   
On initial inspection this may suggest a new wave of privatisations; however, such a 
conclusion is tempered if we view the net changes as a proportion of the total relevant 
population.  During the period 56 cities switched from public to private out of a total 
initial population of 443 public providers (as of 2000), or 13 per cent; 21 cities switched 
in the opposite direction out of a total population of  53 private providers (as of 2000), 
or 40 per cent.  This latter view, although at best an approximation due to the change in 
the sample over time, suggests a rolling back of private provision.  
There is some indication that the pace of privatisation may have slowed after the global 
recession which began in 2008. There were 16 privatisations (or 8 net privatisations) in 
the period 2000 to 2004; this rose to 25 privatisations (or 19 net privatisations) in the 
period 2005 to 2009; and then fell back to 15 privatisations (8 net privatisations) in the 
period 2010 to 2015. 
Table 2.3: World snapshot 2015 and movement 2000-2015 (cities > 5 mn) 
In mega-cities with populations over 5 million, 16 per cent of cities (17 per cent by 
population) are served by private providers (see table 2.3), down from 20 per cent in 
Lobina and Hall (2008).  This runs counter to their assumption that the proportion 
covered by private providers would be higher in the largest cities, and complicates any 
attempt to extend the picture to the global population.  It should also be noted that, at 
the opposite end of the population spectrum, many high-profile re-municipalisations, as 
well as an increasing number of privatisations, have occurred in cities under one million 
and in peri-urban regions.   
In this paper we have not addressed the governance of rural water supply systems.  
Based on the slow pace and reluctance of private providers to extend supply networks 
to the rural poor (Bakker 2013), it can be assumed that rural populations remain 
overwhelmingly served by the public sector, including international development 
agencies (WHO/UNICEF 2015). With some 75 per cent of the developing world’s poor 
population still living in rural areas (Ravallion 2007), this brings into question any 
strategy to provide safe drinking water to the poorest which focuses on private 
provision.  
ii.  Variation by region 
The regional picture, both in terms of the presence of private providers and the 
dynamics of management change, is heterogeneous.  In Europe and Central Asia (ECA – 
excluding HICs) and East Asia and Pacific (EAP – excluding HICs), one-quarter of large 
 
 
cities are served by private providers, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) at 19 per cent, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at 18 per cent, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) at 18 per cent, High Income Countries (HIC) at 14 per cent, and 
South Asia (SA) at 10 per cent (see figure 2.1).  This is a different picture from that 
captured by Lobina and Hall (2008) a decade earlier, with the private presence in EAP 
and SA increasing significantly, and further increase in MENA and ECA.    
Figure 2.1: Percentage of cities with private provision by region, 2006/2015 
The dynamic picture is dominated by changes in key countries.  In EAP, over the fifteen 
year period 2000-2015, 26 cities in China have changed from public to private 
provision.  In South Asia, where public provision had previously been completely 
dominant, five cities in India moved to private provision.  In MENA, three major cities in 
Saudi Arabia have moved to private provision in the last decade.  Notable 
remunicipalisations in the USA, France and Germany were outnumbered in the HIC by 
the five cities which privatised in Russia.  The only region to see a net increase in public 
provision was LAC; looking forward this may be challenged by an uneven shift in 
regional governments to the right that tends to favour private over public provision.   
A number of observations shed some further light on this differentiated regional picture.  
First, the picture in East Asia and the Pacific is dominated by what happens in China.  
Transformation of the urban water supply picture in China is reflective of sweeping 
legislative changes and the emergence of major domestic water corporations, both of 
which are further discussed in the case study below.   
Second, South Asia, largely down to changes in India, has witnessed inroads by the 
private sector.  This has coincided with a rightward shift in Indian politics, either 
explicitly in the election of the Bharatiya Janata Party, or, implicitly, in the market-
oriented reforms led by the Indian National Congress.  Prior to this, a number of Indian 
states had pushed ahead more aggressively with privatisation into what had previously 
been blanket public provision.  The Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission 
(JNNURM), part of the Eleventh National Development Plan (2007-2012), was launched 
in December 2005 for a period of seven years with a commitment to significant 
investment in water and sanitation.  Public-private partnerships were endorsed as a 
solution to shortcomings in water provision, and subsidies were made available to 
water projects that involved private investors.  Subsequently PPP contracts in water and 
wastewater grew in the late 2000s, peaking in 2009 (Vedachalam et al. 2015, p.15). The 
twelfth national development plan (2012-2017), including a JNNURM-II, maintains the 
emphasis on the private sector, insisting that PPPs can raise 13-23 per cent of total 
necessary investment in urban renewal (2013, p. 333).  The term ‘people-public-private 
partnerships (PPPPs)’ has been coined, and a key state level reform is the preparation of 
‘implementable PPP policy for cities’ (Planning Commission 2013, p. 356). However, 
staunch opposition to privatisation remains in many cities.  The fluid nature of the 
situation is captured by the return in mid-2016 of Mysore to public management after a 
five-year interlude of private operationviii (The Deccan Herald 2016).    
Third, the trend in the Middle East region reflects developments in Saudi Arabia, where 
the Ministry of Water and Electricity’s Strategic Transformation Plan mandated in 2005 
that privatisation would play a central role in performance improvement in the water 
sector (Ouda et al. 2014, p. 108).  Since that time, contracts have been awarded to 
 
 
international companies for water provision in Riyadh, Jeddah and Mecca, with Medina 
and Dammam (the other two cities in Saudi Arabia with populations over one million) 
currently under consideration.   
Finally, in Europe and Central Asia, a number of high-profile remunicipalisations in 
Western Europe are overshadowed by developments in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, led by Russia.  Private sector penetration into Russian urban water provision is 
marked by the peculiarities of a state approach which combines embezzlement at both 
local and national levels with a programme of protectionism.  This will be discussed in 
detail in the case study below. 
3.  Political economy analysis 
a.  State theory and service delivery  
The empirical exercise has highlighted both the increasing complexity in provision 
arrangements and the need to critically assess how and why particular forms emerge. 
Drawing upon the state theory of Nicos Poulantzas (2014; 1978; 1975), we argue that 
identifying the underlying essence of any provision arrangement requires that we 
unpack state, power, and class relations.  The state is where the results of social struggle 
crystallise in institutionalised regulatory forms only to be challenged again in the future, 
that is, each momentary form of each state is a snapshot of the balance of power 
relations in its state-society-capital (SSC) complex.  Crucial to this is an analysis of social 
relations that crystallise in each individual political unit as an institutional construct as 
it is they that ultimately determine the nature of the relationship among each given 
state, society, and capital.   
The state is a social relation; one where “the balance of forces also changes with shifts in 
the strategic terrains of the economy, state, and wider social formation as well as with 
changes in organisation, strategy, and tactics of specific forces” (Jessop 2016:56 et 
passim). This necessarily includes international (and transnational) relations, including 
the role of foreign capital, that variously enable or curtail the agency of concrete social 
forces in the given SSC as ‘societal power relations and hegemonic orientations of state 
apparatuses are institutionally condensed on different spatial scales’ (Brand et al. 2011, 
p.150).  In Poulantzas’ state-capital framework, the ‘internationalisation of capital 
neither [suppressed], nor [by-passed] the nation states… [I]nternationalisation… deeply 
affects the politics and institutional forms of [all] states by including them in a system of 
interconnections which is in no way confined to the play of external and mutual 
pressures between juxtaposed states and capitals’ (1975, p. 73).  Understanding the role 
of external actors is critical due to the transnationalised nature of corporate functioning, 
split and overlapping authority between national and supranational institutions, and, as 
Bayliss (2016) shows, the increasing financialisation of public services by powerful 
forces of global finance.  
State and society are not separate entities but rather are deeply interconnected. They 
constitute what Cox (1981, p. 127) refers to as the ‘state-society complex’.   Van der Pijl 
(1998) builds upon Cox’s unit of analysis in his theory of transnational class formation 
that allows one to understand how and why certain states appear to act contrary to their 
ideal-type Weberian role of serving their own society, instead aligning with the interests 
 
 
of transnational capital. As Overbeek (2000, p.175) argues ‘… relations among states are, 
as it were, embedded in a wider context of evolving transnational social relations’.  The 
restructuring of the state as a neoliberal institution during the era of the Washington 
Consensus, which has featured an offensive against public service provision, reflects a 
growing entanglement of domestic social relations in transnational power structures; 
interlacing control over water resources and utilities through financialisation (Bayliss 
2016) and ownership into a wider framework of social control by capital (Ekers and 
Loftus 2008). 
This leads us to talk of the state-society complex as a unit of analysis which, Cox argues, 
prevents a fixation on the centrality of the state, treating it as an empty ‘bureaucratic 
entity’ deprived of connection to society. Indeed, the cases presented in this paper 
confirm the intimate and varied relationship between the state and civil society. We also 
suggest that capital must be treated as a force that is shaped by and shapes the state and 
society alike yet has its own degree of autonomy. Thus we shall be extending the ‘state-
society complex’ to the ‘state-society-capital complex’.  Society and the autonomy and 
power it has and exercises in each SSC plays a crucial political role (that is,  
accepting/rejecting private provision at the level of ideas), and practical role (that is, 
accepting/opposing private provision via campaigning, protest, and so on).  Indeed, 
what neoliberal transformation brought to public services, including water provision, is 
the increasing power of capital relative to the state and non-state actors thus changing 
the ‘geometry of social power’ (Swyngedouw 2005, p. 93). 
In light of the framework outlined above, we must study the role and locus of social 
forces in each case in order to identify the reasons for and essence of any change in the 
provision arrangements of urban water.  Bakker (2013) has argued that 
remunicipalisation of a water utility does not always mean a victory for the civil society 
pressure groups or the consumer. On the contrary it may result in an intensification of 
accumulation rivalries (van der Pijl and Yurchenko 2015), signifying that corporate 
actors are shedding less profitable assets or potential liabilities while socialising the 
losses, a common trend in the years following the Great Recession (Konings 2010, p. 3-
30). More generally speaking, what we see in the sector is “the emergence of an 
historically specific socio-environmental relation: one which increasingly seeks to 
articulate the value of all social and environmental relations, including water, in 
economic terms” (Roberts 2008:538). This occurs via direct full or partial ownership, or 
indirectly via financialisation. 
b.  Case studies in the political economy of urban water provision 
i.  Germany: Berlinwasser costly re-municipalisation hampers citizen control 
The German water market is characterised by a mix of private and public provision.  
Private suppliers Gelsenwasser, RWE and E.ON along with some local companies serve 
some 9.5 million people (Lloyd Owen 2012, p. 38). The combined provision system is 
representative of ongoing ideological battles that surround public services ownership in 
Germany. The system of water provision in Berlin is one key example here. 
Privatisation of water in Berlin started in 1994 with commercialisation – that is, the 
introduction of market-based incentives – of Berliner Wasserbetriebe (BWB) when the 
 
 
Berlin Senate coalition between the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) decided to convert it into a public law corporation; one 
justification being that this would allow it to access private funds needed for 
infrastructure works (Lanz and Eitner 2005, p. 10).  The Berlinwasser project became 
the biggest Public Private Partnership (PPP) in German history by 1999 facilitated by 
the commercialised structure of the Berlinwasser Holding AG (Berlinwasser Holding 
being the owner of Berlin’s water operator, that is, Berliner Wasserbetriebe Anstalt 
öffentlichen Rechts (BWB)) (Petitjean 2013). In 1999, 49.9 per cent of the shares were 
sold to a consortium that included RWE and Veolia for DM 3.3 billion (€1.69 billion). 
Private managerial control over the enterprise was secured through the appointment of 
the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer. The contract with RWE and Veolia 
guaranteed that the return on equity for the private shareholders would be 8 per cent, 
and this level of profitability would be guaranteed by the state of Berlin for 28 years.  
This guarantee came largely at the expense of household water prices (Händel 2013) 
that rose by 23 per cent by 2006 and were projected to rise by 30 per cent by 2010 with 
profits going disproportionately to the private party (Passadakis 2006, p. 15). 
Guaranteed under contract law between 1999 to 2003, €366.6 million ‘were flushed 
into the registers of the companies, while the [municipality] of Berlin only received 
€133.2 million [even though it held] 51.1 per cent of the shares of the BWB and Veolia 
and RWE together 49.9 per cent’ (Passadakis 2006, p. 17). Moreover, BWB 
infrastructure was continuously eroded ‘due to severe under-investment’ which 
‘generates future financial and technological pressures in terms of infrastructure 
rehabilitation which will be most difficult to resolve’ (Lanz and Eitner 2005, p. 21) 
Table 3.1 Organisation of water supply in Germany, 2005. In per cent weighted by water 
quantities 
Source: Kraemer, Pieler and de Roo (2007, p. 24), adapted from Wackerbauer (2007)  
BWB privatisation was met with opposition; by 2004 Attac Berlin began to scrutinise 
the legitimacy of the partial privatisation of BWB (European Water Movement 2013). By 
2005, the supply lansdscape of Germany’s water was mixed, utilities fell under 
compound forms of supply and were regulated by a mix of public and private law.  Table 
3.1 shows the complex organisational structure of water supply weighted by quantity 
supplied. In May 2006, Attac held an event that created the Berlin Water Table (BWT) – 
a network constituted by Attac, several other environmental justice organisations, 
parties (e.g. Piratenpartei, Alliance 90/The Greens), the Council of Catholics in the Berlin 
Archdiocese, and other associations and activist groups - to campaign for water as a 
human right (Environmental Justice Atlas 2014). The process included a lengthy battle 
for remunicipalisation with two rounds of mass petitions for the disclosure of 
privatisation documents, attempts by the Senate to block disclosure legislation, and a 
historic court victory over the same (Beveridge and Naumann 2014). The apex of the 
campaign was the popular referendum in 2011 where 666,235 Berliners voted in favour 
of the proposition ‘Berliners want their water back’ (Terhorst 2014). This did not 
instantly translate into political action. The private contract was, however, so unpopular 
that, in the city elections of September 2011, remunicipalisation ‘… was in the manifesto 
of three of the four major political parties, despite the fact that Berlin still has huge 
debts’ (Beveridge et al. 2014, p. 66).  
 
 
The contract was terminated and the state of Berlin bought back the shares of RWE and 
Veolia in April 2012 and September 2013 respectively. While the enterprise was 
returned into public ownership, the final accurate figure of the buyback cost to the 
taxpayer is unknown. Due to German and EU regulations, investment protection 
mechanisms and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU agreements (EC 2013), the 
repurchase of shares alone cost Berlin €618 million paid to RWE and €590 million to 
Veolia (plus €54 million from a range of financial operations), all financed by 30-year 
loans  (European Water Movement 2013; Petitjean 2013).  This was in addition to the 
payout for the loss of future profit that was guaranteed in the initial contract and was 
paid out in cash on repurchase. Even though the municipality was paid for its shares 
initially, it later had to top up the companies’ profits to match the level specified in the 
contract.  Customers would have to pay higher water prices for 30 years after the 
remunicipalisation (Lobina et al 2014, p. 8), a process that still carries on as the loans 
taken to buy out the investors need to be repaid. 
In 1999, when the decision to engage private capital was taken, two factors played an 
important role. First, there was ‘strong ideological motivation of some politicians to 
privatise as many public enterprises as possible’ (Lanz and Eitner 2005, p. 11), and 
second, Berlin city public finances were very strained at the time (Ibid). Considering the 
cost of privatisation that has been borne since, it becomes clear that only ideological 
motivations for privatisation as a solution to budgetary shortages survive. The full 
negative financial consequences of the BWB affair are still to be felt (Petitjean 2013).  
The battle between ex-private capital owners, the state, and civil society is not over. The 
next step is democratisation of public control over the water supply. With that in mind 
the Berlin Water Council was founded in November 2013, as an open forum ‘for 
everyone who wishes to become involved in the planning and implementation of this 
new Berliner Wasserbetriebe under the citizens’ control’ (Terhorst 2014). Public 
cooperation in the campaign resulted in the drafting of the Berlin Water Charter which 
seeks to ‘democratise both Berliner Wasserbetriebe and water policy as a whole, and so 
achieve transparent, socially just and environmentally sustainable domestic water 
management in Berlin’ (Berlin Water Charter 2013, p. 1). The charter is being used as ‘a 
means to propose and discuss political, economic, ecological and legal principles for a 
new public water utility in citizens’ hands’ and withstand future privatisation pressures 
(Ibid).  
In Germany’s case social actors such as  social movements, platforms and NGOs  play a 
relatively strong role in deciding how water services are governed. These actors are 
politically active and the state is characterised by societal responsiveness. It is the 
politicisation of citizenry and the relative balance in SSC relations (it varies across the 
economic sectors) that allows for remunicipalisation battles to be waged. At the same 
time, the state and capital are intimately intertwined where the state holds ownership 
stakes in private companies and supports investor protection at the regional and 
international levels, later translating such protections into domestic contractual law. 
This can lead to conflicts between, on the one hand, the state’s support for private 
provision and commitments to investment protection, and, on the other hand, its 
commitments as a public entity to quality, affordability, and universality of supply. 
 
 
ii. Russia: State-oligarchy nexus subverts universal commitments 
Russia has witnessed a fundamental shift in approach to water provision since the 
demise of the USSR in 1991.  The Soviet approach was based on providing universal 
access to what was considered a basic resource crucial for social reproduction. The state 
held a monopoly on both water resources and the supply system, and delivered water 
services at symbolic rates.  
For nearly 20 years there has been a push for the commercialisation of water supply and 
sanitation. Private oligarchies entered the Russian water and wastewater treatment 
market in 2002.  Prior to that private sector participation in Russia’s water provision 
had been relatively low; since that time it has been dominated by domestic oligarchic 
groups.  Komarov et al. (2008) argue that commercialisation and privatisation are 
diametrically opposed to the state’s rhetorical commitment to universal access.  This 
contradiction is at the heart of Russia’s state discourse and praxis alike, and it became 
institutionalised with Putin’s ‘Politburo 2.0’, a centralised state-economy control 
apparatus in the likeness of the Soviet Politburo (Minchenko and Petrov 2014), 
spreading its grip over the country since the early 2000s (Nemtsov and Milov 2008).   
In 2003, soon after coming to power, President Putin declared that universal access to 
‘our national treasure’ constituted an ‘absolute and basic priority’ (Komarov et al. 2008, 
p. 42).  Reflecting the gap between declaration and praxis, by 2004, 50 large city water 
supply and sanitation enterprises were already in private hands.  Ownership transfer 
was usually accompanied by gross procedural violations and the assumption by the 
state of the high risks associated with the new owners’ ability to fulfil contract 
obligations (Hall and Popov 2005). Procedural violations included: direct transfer of 
ownership without a tendering process; lack of financial reporting; lack of concrete 
investor obligations for the operating enterprise; and lack of concrete rules on tariff 
change (OECD 2006, p. 42).  
According to Komarov et al. (2008, p. 47): ‘… the water supply and wastewater 
management sector “playing field” is characterised by manipulations of Russian 
oligarchic groups and local authorities. The two create joint enterprises to operate in the 
sector which then use market mechanisms for economic and political gain. The 
mechanisms include appropriation, (re)sale, formation of subsidiaries, restructuring, 
diversification, etc.’ By 2005 a few of the main private players in the water utility market 
held the majority of market shares and some 70 per cent of total market revenues 
(Padmanabhan 2005).  By 2008 these new private operators supplied some 15 million 
customers, a two-fold increase compared to 2004.  The largest financial-industrial 
groups involved in Russian public water utilities, illustrative of their close links with the 
Russian state, are: RAO UESR (Russian Joint Stock Company - Unified Energy System of 
Russia)ix, Russian Public Investment (RKI)x, Alfa Groupxi, and Eurasian Water 
Partnership (EWP)xii.  
The Russian market has been as attractive as it has been difficult to enter for foreign 
companies for reasons of political and economic instability, lack of transparency of the 
market and state administrative procedures, and the role of the state and oligarchic 
companies in the market (Danilov-Danilyan et al. 2015,  Hall and Popov 2005).  Foreign 
investors are more often engaged in the sector on a contractual/project basis or as a co-
investor in a Russian group. Veolia, for example, after being in Russia’s market since 
 
 
1991, was allowed to purchase 49 per cent of the shares of the Eurasian Water 
Partnership (EWP) in 2006 (Danilov-Danilyan et al. 2015, p. 379).  
However, peculiar contradictions arise when partnerships are formed where capital – 
domestic and foreign – and the state negotiate using controversial legislation. One such 
example is the case of Tomsk, where water supply infrastructure plans were withheld 
from the operator. This was justified with the explanation that the plans were a ‘military 
secret’ (Kryvoshapko and Shchadrina 2013) and therefore could not be shared with 
Veolia, a foreign company. Analogous plans are readily shared with domestic operators, 
despite the fact that as market actors they are bound by the same degree of contractual 
confidentiality as Veolia. Such differential legislative treatment can be interpreted as a 
careful policy of economic protectionism conducted in the interests of domestic 
oligarchic capital.   
Infrastructural inefficiency is an ongoing issue as 50 per cent of water is wasted during 
transportation due to the aging infrastructure (Danilov-Danilyan et al. 2015, p. 378). 
The shortage of funds for maintenance and investment leads Russia’s government to 
increasingly rely on international aid agencies such as the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). The European Union  has provided funds to encourage market solutions to 
these problems (Padnumabhan 2005).  It appears that since 2012 Russia’s government 
has taken an approach where the attraction of IFI funds and foreign private firms is 
combined with formal state ownership of utilities with a close eye on performance 
indicators and tariff levels. The approach is selective and does not apply to previously 
privatised water utilities predominantly owned by domestic oligarchic firms. 
As of 1 January 2013, a law came into force which represents a partial reversal of the 
policy approach adopted in the previous decade. The new law bans new privatisations 
and allows remunicipalisations in cases where existing contracts have been violated. 
Only unitary, that is fully state-owned, water utilities can now be floated (Godsuma 
2015, 2012)xiii. As a result of the reforms, the state maintains inalienable ownership 
rights over water utilities but with a clear preference for private capital operating the 
utilities, and a skewed tendering procedure invoking selective state secret access 
licensing for private investors. More positively, tariff limits have been made part of 
concession contracts; guarantees of supply continuity and quality have been introduced; 
and environmental responsibility has been included in legislation. In order to 
understand who is the main benefactor of the contracts one needs to look into 
individual cases to examine how contracts are priced.  
The state approach in Russia reflects the strong link between the state and domestic 
capital. An increasing shortage of funds for maintenance and investment, due to 
economic sanctions over Russian military engagement in Ukraine, will continue to put a 
strain on the water provision for the foreseeable future. This suggests an ongoing 
reliance on IFIs’ funds combined with subsidies for mainly domestic private operators. 
With no meaningful civil society opposition in sight, the dynamic is likely to continue to 
be determined by the state-capital nexus. 
iii.  China:  Shenzhen establishes privatisation model under public aegis 
Private actors in water provision are a new phenomenon in China. Until recently the 
 
 
state held full control over all elements of water provision.  After a decade-long pilot 
period, foreign investors were formally permitted to enter the Chinese municipal water 
service sector in 2002 (Jiang and Zheng 2014).  The respective rights and duties of both 
public actors and private enterprises were spelled out in legislation promulgated in 
2004; this specifies procedures for  involving the private sector through the awarding of 
concession rights (Gun 2008).  By the mid 2000s, China had become the largest water 
PPP market in the world (Jensen 2016, p. 2), and Jiang and Zheng (2014) estimate that 
by 2007, 22 per cent of 208 urban water utilities had majority private ownership.    
In water supply projects involving private investors, the dominant form of private 
participation is through either share transfers or joint ventures (Jiang and Zheng 2014, 
p. 9).  In the former mode, payment made by the private firm goes to the local 
government, while in the latter, the funding stays in the joint venture company.  Joint 
ventures have been a method through which domestic water utilities have increased 
their influence.  Leading domestic state-backed firms, such as Beijing Capital Company 
(BCC) and Beijing Enterprises Water Limited (BEWG) have witnessed spectacular 
growth in their revenues and assets under management.  BCC’s assets rose from 14,445 
million CNY in 2009 to 24,326 million CNY in 2013; during the same period, BEWG rose 
from 1,198 to 7,133 million CNY (Marketline 2015). 
 
Shenzhen has played a pivotal role in laying the groundwork for the rolling out of the 
joint venture model in urban water supply.  To understand this, it is important to 
understand Shenzhen’s unique role in China’s development plans.  Shenzhen was 
established as a new, experimental city in 1979, and was allowed to operate a market 
economy under China’s open-door policy (Chou and Ding 2015).  Until that time, 
Shenzhen had been a modest market town known by the name Sham Chun Hui, its 
population of 30,000 tiny in comparison to the neighbouring metropolis of Hong Kong.   
In the four southern districts of Shenzhen (Luohu, Futian, Nanshan and Yantian) China’s 
first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) was established.  The SEZ was designed to allow Hong 
Kong firms to move their production lines to mainland China in order to access cheaper 
labour.  Many of the usual benefits of free trade zones, such as cheap land, lower taxes, 
and greater flexibility on profit remittances, were made available to investors.  In the 
intervening years, Shenzhen has become a major manufacturing centre, hosting many of 
China’s leading multinational firms.  It has attracted a large inflow of rural migrant 
labourers, with its population exploding to over ten million.  In 2010, the SEZ was 
expanded to cover all districts of Shenzhen, and authorities are in discussions with Hong 
Kong with the aim of forming a single metropolis which would rank third in the world 
behind only Tokyo and Shanghai. 
From its establishment as an SEZ, Shenzhen was allowed to operate its water works 
with greater autonomy than was normal practice in China.  From the 1980s, the former 
Shenzhen Tap Water Group strived for low profits rather than delivering water below 
cost as was common in other cities (Wei 2014, p. 59).  Wei (2014) describes how in 
2001, the Shenzhen Municipal Government merged assets from the Municipal Drainage 
Management Department into the Tap Water Group, establishing Shenzhen Water 
Group (SWG).  In 2002, SWG was identified as a pilot for investment and financing 
reform by the municipal government, opening the way for international tender for the 
 
 
water concession.  By the end of 2003, the formerly state-owned SWG had been 
transformed into a Sino-foreign joint venture.  The equity structure maintained 55 per 
cent with the state, 40 per cent held by General Capital Investment, a joint venture of 
Veolia Water and Beijing Capital Shares, and 5 per cent was held by Veolia Water.  In 
2004, SWG became a listed company on the Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
In a third stage of reform, starting in 2005, SWG established the Shenzhen Water 
Investment Company (SWIC), a joint venture with the Tianjian Group, specialising in 
investment in water works.  By this time SWG had a presence in 17 water projects in 
Shandong, Jiangsu and 7 other provinces.  Finally, in 2007, permission was given by the 
municipal government, municipal party committee and municipal SASAC (State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission) to acquire controlling shares in 
four water works outside of the SEZ in Shenzhen (Shenzhen Bao’an, Longgang Water, 
Yantian Water and Meisha Water).  
Wei (2011, p. 100) argues that foreign investors weren’t needed to address either a 
funding shortfall or operational inefficiencies; instead, strategic investors were brought 
in for policy reasons so that Shenzhen could serve as a model of investment and 
financing reform.  Globalization Monitor (2009, p. 14) argues that this was part of a 
strategy on behalf of the local government to develop its firm into ‘… a competitive 
transregional, or maybe later transnational, corporation’. 
This highlights the difficult question of how to classify Chinese majority state-owned 
enterprises, as discussed in Jensen (2016).  The World Bank’s PPI database, for example, 
makes the assumption that the public nature of an SOE no longer applies when it wins 
contracts outside of its domestic jurisdiction.  However, this problematises the 
treatment of an SOE when it operates in a municipality other than that in which it is 
headquartered.   The PSP water database makes the very different assumption that what 
matters when classifying an operator as public or private is not ownership, but the 
contract form.  In addition to SWG, this debate is central to our understanding of the 
operations of a number of partially-privatised SOEs, including two of the world’s largest 
water operators, Beijing Capital and Beijing Enterprises Water Group. 
4.  Conclusion 
The first part of our research has given evidence that a new wave of privatisations has 
occurred in large cities especially in a cluster of countries, albeit at a slowing pace and in 
the presence of a new counter-dynamic of remunicipalisation.  From 11 per cent a 
decade ago, 18 per cent of cities with a population over one million worldwide are 
served by private providers.  The presence of private providers has increased 
significantly in East and South Asia, dominated by changes in China and India 
respectively; increases have also been seen in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi 
Arabia and in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Outside of high-income countries, one of 
the most important changes observed has been the rise of domestic private and quasi-
private providers.  
We have argued that a context-specific critical political economy approach is needed to 
inform our understanding of how and why particular forms of provision are assumed.  
Herein we have adapted Nicos Poulantzas’ theorisation of the state and Robert Cox’s 
state-society complex, in order to unpack the nature of different arrangements and 
 
 
explain why and how states tend to favour capital over societies in assigning costs and 
benefits of water provision.  
The case of the Berlin water remunicipalisation demonstrates how strong civil society 
pressure can rebalance power towards challenging capital and result in the 
reinstatement of municipal ownership. Specificities in the SSC in Germany meant that 
civil society was able to exert a strong influence on the state.  However, due to 
regulatory commitments that assigned primacy to the rights of capital to profit, the 
municipality had to pay high compensation costs to the private supplier, with financial 
effects that will be felt by the municipality for years to come.  Even with Germany’s 
strong civil society institutional bargaining power, achieving democratic control over 
the enterprise is an ongoing battle.  
Underlying the rise in private provision in Russia highlighted by the empirical exercise 
is an attempt by the ruling regime to exploit international agencies’ support while at the 
same time carefully safeguarding the interests of its own domestic private capital.  The 
specificities of the SSC complex in Russia favour the state-domestic capital nexus at the 
expense of the end user, both directly through poor services and tariff increases, and 
indirectly via budgetary subsidies to private firms. The connection between domestic 
capital and state institutional forms allows for both protection from foreign capital in 
the water market and exploitation of aid funds to be used alongside or in combination 
with state budgetary subsidies. Civil society being institutionally and historically 
disempowered, this dynamic is likely to remain intact for the foreseeable future. 
Finally, the Shenzhen example illustrates the ambition of public authorities which lies 
behind the rise in quasi-private provision in China.  Multinational water firms were 
permitted entry in order to bolster domestic support for the desired political reforms in 
the foreign investment framework.  The municipal state then took advantage of this 
development to promote a utility which could expand first domestically, and ultimately 
become one of the largest global players in water supply and sanitation, all the while 
maintaining foreign capital participation, albeit as minority stakeholders.  The impact of 
the playing out of this strategy on Chinese citizens’ access to water requires further 
study. 
The new ontological complexities pose new challenges for researchers, policy-makers, 
and social movements alike. The Weberian perception of the role of the state, associated 
with post-WWII welfare state public services provision in high-income countries, needs 
to be revisited and questioned in the light of the shifts that occurred during the 
neoliberal retreat of state control over the economy and the resulting effects on the 
modes of public services provision.  An account of the uneven history of global 
institutional geography within and beyond the high-income countries is critical. Public 
provision does not automatically mean public interest but can conceal different 
combinations of interests that must be scrutinised if the public interest is to be 
protected.  
i While Lloyd Owen (2012) estimated that over a billion people receive water services 
from the private sector, this estimate includes wastewater services and governance 
arrangements where the private sector is a minority stakeholder. Marin (2009) 
                                                             
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
documents the expansion of PPPs in urban water for the years between 1990 and 
2007, however the study is limited to an analysis of 65 large PPPs that had been in 
place for a minimum of five years. 
ii It should be noted that Russia has re-regulated control of water utilities in 2015 and 
thus final results of the reforms at the time of writing remain to be seen. 
iii Despite the use of the same unit of analysis, strict comparability is not possible.  Due to 
both shifting demographics and geographical boundaries, comparison between the 
two periods should be understood to be indicative only. 
iv Cities are assigned to the private sector if the responsibility for the operation of the water 
supply services is held by a company which is controlled by private owners. This definition 
includes all concessions, leases and management contracts under which a private company 
is responsible for the operation of water distribution services in cities. The definition of 
‘operation of water distribution services’ excludes cases where operating responsibility 
clearly remains with a public sector entity: cases of contracting-out of specific functions 
[…]; BOTs and other contracts for water or wastewater treatment plants, where the private 
presence is clearly limited to a defined bulk water supply or treatment function; and 
excludes any contracts solely for sanitation. The definition of ‘private’ includes all operators 
which are more than 50 per cent privately owned, or a joint venture between a public 
authority and a private company where the private company has effective management 
control: but does not include operations where a minority of shares have been sold to the 
public, but without a private company buying a controlling stake. Where cities are split, 
with one part operated by the private sector, then the city is treated as private.  
v This is partly due to the increasing corporatisation of the sector. Lobina and Hall 
(2014, p. 2 et passim) identify two types of corporatisation – weak and strong. 
‘Weak’ corporatisation is characterised by short distance between the public 
owners and the managers that leads to the utilities being governed by the public 
law. ‘Strong’ means longer distance between the owners and the managers that 
gives more autonomy to the corporate operators and leads to the utilities being 
governed by the private law.  
vi The election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico in July 2018 may signal a 
change in direction. 
vii There were a handful of cities that switched from public to private and back to public 
again which has been recorded as no net change. 
viii According to how temporal boundaries have been drawn for our empirical study, 
Mysore has been classified as private. 
ix The company which owns Rosiiskiye Komunalniye Sistemy (Russian Communal 
System/RKS). Russian Communal System was established by the state-owned 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Gazprom bank and large oligarch-owned conglomerates.  Minchenko and Petrov 
(2014) provide evidence of its close links to Russia’s state administration and 
preferential access to funds and tender auctions. 
x RKI is a subsidiary of the Basic Element Group owned by Oleg Deripaska, one of Russia’s most 
notorious oligarchs and member of the Politburo 2.0 state economy control network 
(Minchenko and Petrov 2014). 
xi Alfa Group was formed by Mikhail Friedman through privatisation of one of the key 
Soviet public utility enterprises, RosVodokanal (Padmanabhan 2005). This allowed 
Alfa-Eco to gain access to technology and infrastructure of the sector across Russia. 
Its ex-president Gleb Fetisov then became a member of Russia’s Federal Council. 
xii EWP was formed in September 2004 by former associates of RKS. Simultaneously the 
special investment fund Euraziyskiy was reinstated. It was initially formed in 1994 
and is infamous for breach of contract (GWI 2005), ownership ties with Cypriot 
shell companies and use of transfer pricing for tax evasion (Oleynik 2015).  
xiii Under law 416-F3 on water supply and sewerage, article 41.1.1 states that ‘ownership 
and/or operation right transfer over centralised municipal or state water utilities 
must occur in accordance with antimonopoly legislation, civil law… on 
lease/concession basis in accordance with Article 9 of current legislation…’ 
(Gosduma 2012, amended 2015). The latter bans alienation i.e. full privatisation, of 
municipal or state owned water utilities. Article 9.2 of the same law secures 50+1 
per cent share ownership by the state or municipality. Concessions, leases, and 
partial privatisation up to 49 per cent are allowed. Concessions are now to be 
agreed via an open tendering procedure. However, in cities with populations over 
300,000 where infrastructure information is deemed to be a state secret, only 
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